The legal framework governing the payment of a one-off cash reward of 1 million UAH is set out in Resolution No. 153 of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated 11 February 2025, ‘On the implementation of a pilot project to increase motivation amongst certain categories of Ukrainian citizens to undertake military service during a state of martial law’.
In accordance with the aforementioned resolution, military personnel are entitled to the payment if they meet all of the following conditions:
● they entered military service before the age of 25 after 24 February 2022;
● were enlisted in military service either through mobilisation or under a contract;
● took direct part in combat operations for a total of more than six months (if the period is shorter, the payment is made in proportion to the number of days of participation). However, for service personnel released from captivity, as well as for those who sustained injuries whilst defending their homeland, the number of days spent in combat operations is irrelevant — the payment is made in full;
● military personnel are not eligible for this remuneration if they have been held criminally liable; have been held liable on two or more occasions for military administrative offences; or have been subject to disciplinary action before the expiry of the penalty or its removal;
● are currently serving military personnel or were discharged from service after 13 February 2025 — the date on which the resolution comes into force.
In addition to the main category of military personnel, the resolution also provides for the right to receive remuneration for individuals who meet the specified conditions and:
● were enlisted for contract military service during martial law from among those who were serving their compulsory military service;
● performed military service and were certified prior to being awarded the initial officer rank of ‘second lieutenant’;
● performed military service, held special ranks or class ranks, and were recertified prior to being awarded an officer rank.

Thus, the resolution applies primarily to individuals who were enlisted or conscripted into military service after 24 February 2022 at the age of under 25. The exception regarding eligibility for payment for persons who were on active service prior to the start of the full-scale aggression effectively applies only to conscripts who, during martial law, entered into a contract for military service and meet the other specified conditions.

Problems with the implementation of Resolution No. 153

Discrepancies regarding the payment of a one-off cash payment arise for two main reasons: shortcomings in the legislation or the incorrect application of the resolution by military units.
Legislative frameworkAt present, military personnel discharged before 13 February 2025 for virtually any reason are not entitled to receive compensation:● Military personnel discharged on health grounds do not receive any payment. Individuals who, as a result of injuries or illnesses, were unable to continue their service until 13 February 2025 and were discharged earlier do not, strictly speaking, fall within the scope of the resolution. There is already established case law on this basis — ‘health status is a circumstance beyond the military personnel’s control’. In practice, therefore, such individuals can only access the payment through the courts, which creates additional difficulties for military personnel.
● Service personnel discharged from service on the grounds of having been held captive do not receive the payment Among those released from captivity, there is also a category of service personnel who fall into the same age group and have participated in combat operations, but who were discharged from military service following their release from captivity, on the relevant grounds. Thus, formally, such service personnel, like those discharged on health grounds, do not meet the conditions for receiving the OGV payment. However, it should be noted that the majority of service personnel released from captivity have injuries sustained during combat operations and/or illnesses contracted whilst in captivity. Judging by the number of requests for legal assistance from service personnel, we assume that it is precisely this category of people who currently face the greatest difficulties in accessing these payments.
● Service personnel discharged on grounds other than health are not eligible for the payment. For example, a service member mobilised on 24 February 2022 at the age of under 25 could have served for almost three years, until 13 February 2025. If discharged on grounds other than health reasons beyond the serviceman’s control, he will not receive the payment, even though he actually served for longer than his peers, who are eligible under this resolution for one year’s service.
● The inability of police officers who are fighting (for example, members of the ‘Ljut’ Special Forces Brigade) to receive the OGV. The Ministry of the Interior is a participant in the programme; however, according to the Resolution, only military personnel currently on active service are eligible for the OGV, whilst police officers have a different status. Servicemen and veterans who were held captive during the full-scale invasion and were discharged from service before 13 February 2025 are not entitled to the payment. Following their release from captivity (or exchange), they are entitled to discharge from military service after undergoing treatment and appropriate rehabilitation. This is because the vast majority of former prisoners of war suffered injuries or illnesses sustained in combat or whilst in captivity.Furthermore, the conditions of captivity are characterised by cruel treatment or abuse, resulting from violations of the Geneva Conventions, which have a severe impact on mental health.
In other words, there are several categories of military personnel who, due to the circumstances of their service, are not eligible for the payment:● military personnel who were held captive (provided they meet the other criteria) and who were discharged from service before 13 February 2025 are not eligible for the payment, whilst those discharged after that date may claim it;● conscripts who were serving at the start of the imposition of martial law, signed a contract and were discharged before 13 February 2025 are not entitled to the payment, whilst those discharged after that date are;● Conscripts who were serving up to 24 February 2022 and were unable to sign a contract during the hostilities because they found themselves in a difficult combat situation before being taken prisoner. For example, servicemen who were taken prisoner in 2022 during the fighting in Mariupol.
Law enforcement in military units
● Misinterpretation of ageSome commanders believe that individuals over the age of 25 are not eligible for the payment. This is incorrect, as what matters is the age at which the individual joined the service (under 25), not their current age.
● Unjustified restrictions based on the type of security forceSome military units believe that the resolution applies only to specific sub-units (for example, we have received reports of payments being refused in units of the Main Intelligence Directorate or certain Navy brigades, which claimed that ‘this applies only to the Armed Forces of Ukraine’. Similar cases occur in other military formations outside the Ministry of Defence system).
● Lack of clarification regarding the calculation mechanism.By law, the responsibility for calculating payments lies with unit commanders, but they often do not know how this is done in practice.
● Military units are shifting the responsibility for processing payments onto service personnel. They are placing the burden of gathering documents and, consequently, of demonstrating compliance with the conditions set out in the resolution, on the service personnel themselves. However, no such mechanism is provided for.

● Non-payment of compensation to those discharged from service. Sometimes military units fail to make payments to service personnel who were discharged after 13 February 2025, solely on the grounds that they were discharged. In other words, the servicemen have fulfilled all the conditions set out in CMU Resolution No. 153 and, accordingly, have become entitled to a one-off cash payment, but this payment is not being made to them, which contradicts the provisions of the Ministry of Defence’s Special Order No. 5601, under which such servicemen were also to receive payment.
The problem of the resolution’s implementation by military units can be resolved through additional clarifications, orders or instructions, particularly regarding units operating outside the territory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Other restrictions in accordance with the resolution
The following are not entitled to the payment:
● Military personnel who joined the armed forces as officers.
● Military personnel who commenced their studies at military educational institutions (for example, at a military higher educational institution where a cadet was trained as an officer, or at a military college where a cadet was trained as a non-commissioned officer) before 24 February 2022 and, upon completion of their training course, continued their military service in the Armed Forces. (We have already seen case law concerning a serviceman who was studying at a college, although in that case the study itself was legally defined as ‘fixed-term service’.)
● Military personnel who signed a contract before 24 February 2022 and, accordingly, continued to serve after 24 February 2022 due to the extension of their contract term. There is already established case law awarding compensation to such military personnel in cases where the contract was renewed during martial law.

In practice, when broadening the scope of the eligibility criteria for payment set out in the resolution, the courts largely focus on age — ‘service during martial law up to the age of 25’ — as well as direct participation in combat operations whilst martial law was in force. Consequently, the awarding of payments to those who, under the terms of the resolution, were not originally entitled to receive them will also depend on future judicial practice.

Case law on the award of payments

It is evident from case law that the courts are already effectively highlighting the shortcomings of the resolution. In particular, payments are being awarded to military personnel who were discharged on medical grounds before the resolution came into force. The court confirms that circumstances beyond the serviceman’s control should not restrict access to compensation. In practice, this means that such individuals can only receive payment through the courts, which creates additional difficulties for military personnel.
At the same time, the courts are effectively broadening the scope of the resolution to include military personnel who signed a contract before 24 February 2022 and renewed it during martial law, as well as those who were studying at military colleges or higher military educational institutions prior to that date and continued their service after completing their studies. This interpretation takes into account actual service during martial law and allows the resolution to be applied to individuals who do not formally meet its original conditions.
Discharged on health groundsThis is the first category of military personnel in respect of whom the court’s rulings effectively highlight the shortcomings in the legislation, which places military personnel in unequal (discriminatory) circumstances.
Decision of the Chernihiv District Administrative Court of 25 August 2025 in Case No. 620/6914/25
The court concluded that the discharge of a service member on health grounds, where this is linked to an injury or illness sustained whilst defending the Motherland, cannot constitute grounds for refusing to pay the lump-sum compensation under Resolution No. 153.
In giving its reasons for the decision, the court noted that:● the resolution does not contain any explicit provision that would exclude the right to payment for persons discharged from service;● discharge on health grounds is a circumstance beyond the military personnel’s control;● a narrow interpretation of the resolution’s conditions would lead to a discriminatory approach, as it would place those who lost the ability to continue their service precisely as a result of an injury or illness sustained whilst performing their duties at a disadvantage compared with those who, following an injury, formally remained in service.
Thus, the court effectively held that treating military personnel differently on the basis of their future ability to continue serving, in the absence of any explicit legislative provision, is unjustified and amounts to a restriction of social guarantees. The same conclusions are set out in the Decision of the Volyn Regional Administrative Court of 18 December 2025 in Case No. 140/12475/25, whilst the Decision of the Odesa Regional Administrative Court of 30 October 2025 in Case No. 420/28300/25 has also been upheld on appeal with the same conclusions.
The contract was concluded before martial law came into force
Decision of the Lviv District Administrative Court, Case No. 380/17103/25, 12 January 2026 (currently under appeal):
Persons who entered into a contract for military service prior to the imposition of martial law, but extended the term of that contract during martial law, are entitled to a one-off cash payment, as ‘paying the remuneration only to persons performing military service during the period of martial law would be discriminatory against those who were enlisted before the age of 25 and were serving under a contract prior to the imposition of martial law, and who, following the imposition of martial law, also expressed a desire to continue their military service by extending the term of their existing contract during the period of martial law”. In other words, although the contract is extended automatically rather than at the serviceman’s request, the court nevertheless interprets such an extension of the contract beyond its term as the conclusion of a contract during martial law.
In the ruling of the Luhansk District Administrative Court, in case No. 360/1625/25, dated 20 October 2025, in a similar situation where a serviceman had signed a contract valid until 24 February 2022, the court accepted the fact that a new contract was concluded on 19 July 2022 as falling within the wording ‘enlisted or called up for military service during a state of martial law’.
In the ruling of the Seventh Administrative Court of Appeal in Case No. 560/14855/25 dated 2 February 2026, concerning a situation where a member of the armed forces entered into a contract in 2021 and entered into a new contract in 2023, the court ruled in favour of the member of the armed forces, having regard, in particular, to the following:● the ruling contains no reservations or restrictions regarding the requirement that the contract be signed for the first time, provided that the other conditions set out in the ruling are met;● nor are there any provisions establishing restrictions on the renewal of a contract or on the consideration of, or impact of, previous military service under contract on a person’s right to receive a one-off cash payment.
The court considers that the contract for military service entered into by the serviceman in 2021 has no legal significance for the resolution of the issue concerning the award and payment of the one-off cash payment, since the serviceman entered into a new contract in 2023 that meets the conditions of the resolution. Furthermore, interpreting the relevant provisions in a narrow sense – that is, solely in relation to persons who were first enlisted or conscripted into military service during martial law – would be discriminatory towards persons who, as at 24 February 2022, were already serving in the armed forces and subsequently entered into a contract for military service. No one has the right to restrict the rights and freedoms of military personnel and their family members as defined by Ukrainian law.
In the Supreme Court’s Ruling of 10 January 2024 in Case No. 240/4894/23, the Supreme Court set out a legal conclusion in which it emphasised that the principle of interpreting the law in favour of the individual does not entail disregarding the law, but rather indicates that, in cases of dispute, the courts must endeavour to choose an interpretation of the law that best protects the rights and interests of the individual: ‘in cases of reasonable doubt — in favour of the individual’. Decision of the Lviv District Administrative Court, Case No. 380/14556/25, 6 November 2025:

A member of the armed forces underwent training at a military college until 24 February 2022 (which, according to the regulations, was considered conscripted service), and after the imposition of martial law, signed a contract for military service. The court recognised that the claimant was entitled to payment, interpreting the relevant conditions as “enlistment in the armed forces on a contractual basis during martial law from among those who had completed compulsory military service”. Furthermore, as in previous rulings, the court assessed any alternative interpretation as one that would constitute discrimination.
Given the circumstances of the above-mentioned rulings, whereby military personnel who signed a contract before 24 February 2022 and continued their service during martial law, as well as military personnel who were studying at military colleges and continued their service under contract during martial law, are granted confirmation of their right to claim the payment, and since a refusal to make such a payment is recognised by the court as discriminatory, we may assume that a refusal to pay cadets at military higher education institutions who commenced their studies before 24 February 2022 and served during martial law may also be interpreted as discriminatory.

Consequently, the courts have reached differing conclusions regarding the eligibility for a one-off cash payment for military personnel who, in particular, were enlisted under a contract prior to the imposition of martial law on 24 February 2022.

Some courts note that service under a contract that was automatically extended is equivalent to the conclusion of a new contract, and also point to discrimination against those who entered into such a contract before 24 February 2022.
Other courts regard the renewal of a contract whilst martial law is in force as a fact of legal significance and, in effect, treat the very act of concluding the contract as the start of a new period of military service. At the same time, they consider the previously concluded contract to be of no legal significance for the resolution of cases of this nature. Furthermore, they cite the Supreme Court’s legal opinion as grounds for justifying a favourable ruling in favour of the serviceman, namely: the principle of interpreting the law in favour of the individual (as mentioned in the Supreme Court’s ruling).

Conclusions

Consequently, the primary aim of the payment was to increase the motivation of people aged 18–24 to voluntarily join the armed forces during martial law. In other words, it is compensation for the risk they are taking.
For such individuals, the following have been established:
● the duration of the proposed contract (1 or 2 years, depending on the post),
● the period of participation in combat operations (at least 6 or 12 months, depending on the post), which is a mandatory condition.

At the same time, the resolution was extended to cover individuals who joined the armed forces prior to the resolution’s adoption and who meet the conditions set out therein. For this category, the legislator introduced an additional requirement — a period of service ending on 13 February 2025. In other words, regardless of whether a person joined the armed forces in 2022 or 2024, their period of service had to extend until 13 February 2025. At the same time, service personnel who signed a contract after the resolution came into force can serve for one year and receive the payment; however, some service personnel may have served for several years, been discharged before 13 February 2025, and lost their entitlement to it.
Furthermore, this requirement also applies to those who were discharged from service on medical grounds or who exercised their right to discharge following captivity, which, in our view, is discriminatory. With regard to those discharged on medical grounds, we are already seeing positive case law.

At the same time, alongside the ‘purpose of payment’ approach adopted by the legislature for those who voluntarily joined the armed forces, we are observing the emergence of a judicial practice that extends the scope of eligibility beyond the limits set by the resolution, specifically for service personnel who had already been enlisted before the start of martial law, but who meet all other conditions, the key one being that they served during martial law whilst under the age of 25. These are individuals who, prior to 24 February 2022, had signed a contract which, in wartime, is automatically extended – that is, without their consent – whilst, under the resolution, volunteers are offered a one-year contract in order to receive remuneration. There is also a practice concerning those military personnel who underwent training before the start of martial law and subsequently served under contract during martial law. Consequently, we have two further categories in which there may be indications of discrimination.

These two categories are characterised by having commenced military service before 24 February 2022 and by the obligation to continue service during martial law, unlike the categories defined by the legislator. And this is the sole difference that prevents the aforementioned categories from receiving payment under the resolution.
Practice shows that the courts have begun to shift the focus from a formal criterion — the date on which the first contract was signed or service commenced — to the actual substance: being in military service during martial law at an age under 25 and participating in combat operations.

If we take the concept of remuneration as compensation for the risk and service in wartime at a certain age, then the decisive criterion should be precisely the fact of service during martial law, rather than the date of initial enlistment. Otherwise, situations that are identical in substance will continue to be assessed differently, creating a risk of discrimination and a further expansion of judicial intervention.